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Abstract 
Research on aid is continuously exploring new channels to measure its 
effectiveness on economic development. The Millennium Development Goals 
have set the standard for aid policy-making and now, when facing deadline, its 
partakers have to set a new aid policy-agenda. The European Union is the largest 
donor of official development assistance (ODA), contributing a total of 50-60 
percent of world ODA. Still the EU struggles with finding conclusive evidence of 
the effectiveness of aid. In the light of the above, this paper provides a panel data 
regression analysis of whether EU aid shows any short-term effect on foreign 
direct investments in developing countries and if so, if it is possible to distinguish 
what kind of EU aid is most effective in doing so. ODA is subcategorized into 
three target sectors: economic infrastructure, production sectors and social 
infrastructure. The study takes its stand from FDI- and aid theory, relative 
developing countries and in the light of the EU. The effectiveness of EU ODA on 
FDI-inflows to developing countries is tested using a fixed effects OLS estimator 
and undergoes three sensitivity checks. The result shows that EU ODA has a 
positive statistical significant effect in promoting FDI and that a narrower 
approach is required to determine the sectorial effects respectively.  
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1 Introduction 
Most researchers agree: economic growth is the key for developing countries to reduce 
poverty, and the Millennium Development Goals have come to set the agenda for policy 
construction within the field of sustainable development through the last decade. However, 
the effectiveness of aid on economic growth has been widely disputed among researchers. 
Newer research looks away from the gross domestic product as a standard, and investigate 
other channels for aid to promote development. This is especially relevant within the 
European Union, globally the largest donor of official development aid. As the Millennium 
Declaration reaches its deadline 2015, its partakers will have to review and potentially 
redefine their post-2015 objectives.  
 
The European Union (EU) has modeled its development policies around the millennium 
development goals (MDGs) and is the largest official development assistance (ODA)-donor in 
the world, contributing 50-60% of total ODA (EU, 2013, p. 46, 222, 2013). Still the European 
Report on Development (2013) finds it hard to evaluate EU’s effect of their activity in the 
MDGs. The development goals and strategies are now being reviewed and reassessed as a 
new policy agenda for development is on the table. In the light of EU’s new agenda to go 
“beyond aid” and finding new channels for economic development, a study looking at EU aid 
effectiveness on foreign direct investment is most current and highly relevant.  
 
The new goal is to go “beyond aid” and investment is highlighted as such a potential channel. 
This paper provides an empirical econometric study of whether EU aid shows any short-term 
effect on foreign direct investments in developing countries and if it is possible to distinguish 
what kind of EU aid is most effective in doing so. Empirical studies on the topic are limited 
and have inconclusive results, which encouraged the research question of this study: Does EU 
official development assistance have any effect on world foreign direct investment in 
developing countries? And if so, can we detect what kind of EU official development 
assistance is most efficient? 
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I perform a fixed effects panel-data regression analysis on 59 developing countries covering 
the timespan 1995-2012, using EU sectorial ODA data, a number of control variables 
estimated by OLS. EU official development assistance is represented by three different 
sectors, categorized by the OECD’s creditor reporting system, targeting economic 
infrastructure, production sectors and social infrastructure in developing countries. I have not 
found any previous study with this specific categorical classification of EU aid and FDI. My 
results show that EU ODA is significant and effective in promoting FDI, but it is difficult to 
distinguish the separate efficiency of the ODA sectors. 
 
This paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 gives a theoretical background to the analysis and 
outlines previous research and the perspective of the European Union. Section 3 explains the 
empirical method, the variable components and presents the general model. Section 4 presents 
the regression results. Section 5 provides a discussion and analysis of the regression results, 
followed by concluding remarks.  
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2 FDI Theory for Developing 
Countries 
An overview of the theories of FDI relative developing countries will be presented here. The 
theoretical background together with previous research will constitute the theoretical 
framework for this investigation, setting the premises for the FDI-determinants used in my 
regression. First I will explain the purpose of looking at FDI as a valid channel for official 
development assistance (ODA) in the context of FDI theory. I will then account for different 
FDI-theoretical approaches to set a background to the FDI determinants. Next, previous 
research in aid-FDI is presented. And lastly, I will discuss the relevance of looking at EU in 
this context.   
 
2.1 FDI as a Resource in Developing Countries 
The effect of foreign aid in developing countries is subjected to disagreements among 
empirical aid researchers. Traditionally, such research looked at the impact of aid on 
economic growth. Why then, do we care about the aid effect on foreign direct investment? 
FDI theory suggests that there are positive attributes associated with FDI-inflows to 
developing countries and that FDI in developing countries constitute a source of capital, 
technology and knowledge. FDI can bring about industrial upgrading, by creating knowledge 
spillovers to other sectors than first targeted (Dunning & Narula 2000, 148-149). Foreign 
direct investment has also been suggested to be the most efficient option for developing 
countries to catch up in their industrial upgrading process due to the following reasons. First, 
developing countries have limited domestic capital and acquiring technical knowledge and 
organizational know-how is expensive. Second, firms are more inclined to keep control over 
their competitive advantages thus making it difficult for a developing country to enter a firm 
specific sector. Third, policies of infant industry protection are being limited by the World 
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Trade Organization’s framework. Fourth, “the complementary resources necessary to support 
a viable and strong domestic sector are usually capital and knowledge-intensive” and are 
therefore out of bounds for developing countries (Dunning & Narula 2000, p. 149).  
 
Another positive aspect of FDI is that, relative financial flows such as different forms of debt 
finance, e.g. official lending, bond- and bank finance, FDI is an equity finance form of 
financial flows. A multinational corporation in a host country will expect a repayment on its 
investment as a share of the production net returns. From a host country’s perspective the 
implication is, that while debt finances require fixed repayments as agreed, foreign firms 
engaging in direct investments partakes in the host country’s economic climate and shares its 
risks, thus leaving the developing country less vulnerable of repaying loans in difficult 
economic times (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009 p.632). 
 
Furthermore, a large part of development policies today is that of investment, and their 
purpose is to improve returns on investments to poor countries. To facilitate and encourage 
FDI inflows to poor countries is therefore in line with such policy measures, not the least 
within the EU (Te Velde 2006 p.4). To sum up, the possible positive attributes of FDI on 
economic development for a developing country are plentiful.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework for FDI Determinants 
It is useful to here present some of the foundations of FDI theory and FDI theory’s current 
status relative developing countries to set the framework for FDI determinants. This 
presentation derives from articles and studies focusing on FDI to developing countries. I will 
first present the different ways to approach FDI theory and then derive their common ground 
to explain my use of them. 
 
The different FDI-theoretical approaches usually consider FDI as being resource seeking-, 
market seeking- or efficiency seeking- FDI, and the relative importance of the FDI 
determinants may differ depending on type FDI (Nunnenkamp, 2002, p.19). This is taken into 
consideration in the analysis. There are different ways to categorize FDI-determinants. In the 
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literature the different approaches are often interactive. Push and pull factors constitute 
respectively external- and internal determinants to FDI. A similar categorization is that of host 
country factors, home country factors and international factors, where host country factors 
include attributes to attract FDI, i.e. pull it in, e.g. market size and growth, economic 
fundamentals such as human capital and infrastructure, technology, natural resources, trade, 
economic and political governance. Macro-economic factors are considered to be the “basic 
economic pull factors” (te Velde 2006, p. 12), and are generally accepted as a base for FDI 
determinants (although there is still disagreements of their statistical significance). However, 
these variables can also be enhanced by FDI. Home country factors (the country of the 
investing firm) include support to economic fundamentals and institutions, e.g. in the form of 
aid, to the host country. Other home country factors include support to reduce risks in 
investment projects and similar policies facilitating investments abroad. International factors 
are subjected to international agreements: bilateral, regional or multilateral (te Velde, 2012 
and te Velde, 2006).  
 
A well-known and much used FDI-explanatory tool is that of Dunning (2000) who in his 
OLI-paradigm (Ownership- Location- Internalization) accounts for the determinants of FDI 
flows. In short, the aspect of ownership specific advantages considers competitive advantages 
in a multinational corporation. Internalization considers commercial benefits in an intra-firm 
relationship. Location concerns location specific advantages (Dunning & Narula, 2000, p. 
142). This study focuses on location specific factors, equivalent to host country measures. 
 
The premises for developing countries in attracting FDI have shifted over the last two 
decades: In the 1980s and 1990s the quick development of new technologies, especially 
within the information and computer technologies (ICT’s), together with economic 
globalization created interdependence across countries. The now general accepted view of 
FDI as a promoter for economic growth is quite new and previous theory questioned FDI’s 
impact on developing countries, supplying them with “inappropriate technology” and being 
“unhelpful” (Te Velde 2006 p.4). A most important outcome of this shift and the new attitude 
to FDI in developing countries is that their governments have come to recognize that they can 
actively impact their attractiveness to foreign investment through economic and FDI-specific  
policies. Theory suggests that countries less stable receive less FDI, and developing countries 
have increasingly started to create business friendly climates and ridding trade obstacles (te 
Velde, 2006, p. 4, 10).  Rich countries, on the other hand, are somewhat restricted in their 
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policy-making to create business-friendly environments in a developing host country (Mayer, 
2006, s. 9-10). This is also a reason why FDI research in this field is more inclined to use 
host-country determinants to FDI than looking at home country factors.  
 
All above theories accept this shift of FDI premises. In the perspective of OLI-paradigm, as in 
host and home countries and in the light of resource seeking-, market seeking and efficiency 
seeking FDI. Resource-seeking FDI seems to have declined, arguably due to natural resources 
constituting a smaller share of world output, and possibly because this industry is managed to 
a lesser extent by FDI (Nunnenkamp p.21, 2002). Moreover, in many developing countries, 
market-seeking FDI along with more liberal and less protective trade policies have given 
foreign firms the option of exporting to, rather than investing in, the host market. Thus 
investors demand for close market access has declined. However, with an expanding service 
sector it is unclear how market-seeking net FDI is ultimately affected. Finally, efficiency-
seeking FDI is motivated by increased competitiveness among firms and is determined by 
cost, productivity and business facilitation (Nunnenkamp p. 24, 2002). 
 
From an OLI-perspective, the shift in FDI premises for FDI inflows to developing countries 
have come to create a bargaining situation between the location specific advantages of the 
host country and the ownership specific advantages of the foreign firm. Thus, the level of 
development in the host country determines what sort of FDI the country will receive 
(Dunning & Narula 2002, p.144-145). For example, developing countries at an early stage of 
development are more inclined to attract resource-seeking FDI while more developed 
developing countries attract asset-augmenting FDI (Dunning & Narula 2002, p.150). This in 
turn leads to a more fragmented production process, where different parts in the 
manufacturing line occur in different countries (te Velde 2006, p.8.) The location specific 
bargaining condition thus creates incitements to governments in developing countries to 
adjust policy for FDI attraction. It is in within the location specific factors that the core of this 
analysis is formed.  
 
The changing premises for FDI flows to developing countries makes analyzing FDI flows in a 
larger empirical and macro-economic perspective more advanced. Not least is access to well 
defined and accurate data measurements a problem. This study approaches FDI-theory 
through host country measures and specifically macro-economic determinants, traditionally 
also used in previous research presented below (section 2.3). Aid is thus a push-factor for 
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FDI, but not necessarily that of the home country. Moreover, if aid is subjected to rent-
seeking activity, its categorical classification becomes increasingly unclear. Also, much of the 
previous research on the topic aid – FDI uses a theoretical explorative approach.   
 
To sum up, the theoretical framework of FDI is grounded in macro-economic determinants of 
the host country and firm-specific factors of the home country. As FDI is becoming an 
increasingly interesting channel for economic growth, new research is more nuanced and 
layered and is considering aspects of FDI facilitation from a host country perspective. All 
theories suggests a shift of FDI flows from resource seeking to more efficiency seeking, 
hence leaving a developing country in a bargaining situation where governments may 
facilitate the attraction of FDI through policy. By distinguishing sectors or areas where aid 
may in fact support a developing country’s attraction for foreign investment flows, aid 
invested sensibly could help attract FDI, and possibly find an effective channel to economic 
growth.   
 
2.3 Aid and Foreign Direct Investment: Previous 
Research 
It is often pointed out in this field that too little research has been made on the subject of aid 
and FDI, that results are contradictory and that little consensus exists among researchers. 
Most research is looking at the effectiveness of aid and FDI respectively on growth. 
Nevertheless, the general opinion or perhaps wish, is that aid will have some sort of 
catalyzing effect on foreign investment. I will here present some of the previous research 
published on aid effectiveness on foreign direct investment. 
 
In Alesina and Dollar’s “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” (2000), the authors 
investigate the pattern of allocation of foreign aid. They find that: while foreign aid responds 
more directly to “political” openness such as democratization, FDIs respond more to 
“economic” openness such as improvement in policy management, trade liberalization, better 
protection of property rights” (Alesina & Dollar 2000 p. 34). Also they conclude that there 
does not seem to be any mutual dependence between bilateral aid and private flows. In 
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contrast to aid allocation, private flows does not necessarily require good democratic 
institutions, but rather good economic conditions (Alesina & Dollar, 2000, p.56).  
 
Karakaplan, Neyapti and Sayek (2005) investigates whether ODA generates sufficient effects 
to attract foreign direct investments to the aid receiving country. They empirically test their 
hypothesis that countries that receive aid are more likely to receive FDI, especially in cases of 
good governance and financial market development. Their results show that FDI does not 
necessarily flow to countries receiving aid. Both confirming and contradicting the results of 
Alesina and Dollar, Karakaplan et. al. conclude that good governance and stable economic 
markets is more of a catalyzer for the positive effects of aid. 
 
Harms and Lutz investigates whether developing countries that received a larger volume of 
aid attracted more private foreign investment in the 1990s (Harms and Lutz, 2006). They 
make the assumption that developing countries with healthy institutions will benefit from aid 
on private foreign investments. In their analysis they add variables for quality of government. 
Interestingly, their results show that the relationship between aid and private foreign 
investment is significantly positive for developing countries whose government have a low 
capacity to implement “sound policies” and that the marginal effect of ODA on private 
foreign investments is strictly close to zero for developing countries with average institutional 
characteristics (Harms and Lutz 2006 p.774, 776). In contrast to Karakaplan et al., they 
conclude that the catalyzing effect of aid is stronger in the developing countries with 
unhealthy institutions.  
 
Kapfer, Nielsen and Nielson tests whether infrastructure aid leads to an increase of FDI. They 
find that although aid in general has no statistically significant effect on FDI inflows, aid 
directed towards infrastructure does. They also emphasize the need for more research on the 
relationship of FDI and aid (Kapfer et. al. 2007).  
 
Kimura and Todo (2009) investigate whether and how foreign aid facilitates foreign direct 
investment. They use a gravity equation type estimation, pairing up recipient and donor 
countries. They are looking at the vanguard effect in particular: whether a donor country’s aid 
to a recipient country increases the recipient country’s FDI inflow from that same donor 
country in particular, but not from other countries. They distinguish between two types of aid: 
aid for infrastructure and aid for other purposes. Kimura and Todo do not find any significant 
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effect of aid on FDI in general, but in the case of aid from Japan they do find a vanguard 
effect (Kimura & Todo, 2009, p.482-493).  
 
Selaya and Sunesen attempt to apply a theoretical model to the ODA-FDI relationship using 
the Solow growth model. Their study splits the total flow of foreign aid into two categories: 
aid invested in complementary factors and aid invested in physical capital. This approach is 
used to demonstrate that aid invested in complementary factors (such as investments in 
human capital and infrastructure), taking into account scale effects, will increase the marginal 
productivity of capital and thus attract more FDI, while foreign aid invested in physical 
capital may crowd out private, foreign investment. The results of the regression analysis 
showed ambiguity of aid on FDI; that the composition of aid matters; and that the net effect is 
small but always positive (Selaya & Sunesen, 2012).  
 
These studies all use general FDI-theoretical approach in their models and include a set of 
what has become a standard of macro-economic variables, although such standard has never 
shown any general accepted statistical significance. As the literature and previous research is 
vaster in the field of aid-growth than aid-FDI, when required or assumed sensible, theories of 
the former will be applied on the latter. The new generation of research on aid effectiveness is 
characterized by a narrower aid-variable, focusing on short-term effects of aid and alternative 
measures of development to economic growth (Roodman, 2007, p. 7). In such a climate I feel 
that the approach of this analysis is up to date and current. 
2.4 The EU, Aid and Foreign Direct Investment 
This study aims to distinguish specifically EU ODA effectiveness on FDI inflows. I will here 
explain the purpose of and background to this distinction and also look at some current facts 
of ODA sector flows. 
 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were introduced to achieve the principles and 
priorities for “inclusive and sustainable development” of the Millennium Declaration, a 
declaration concluded by the UN in the year of 2000 (EU, p. 12, 2013). The European Report 
on Development (2013) maintains that the success of the Millennium Development Goals can 
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at large be credited to the European Union. At the same time, the report finds is difficult to 
establish a causal link between ”aid” and ”MDG progress” at all (EU,  2013, p. 46). 
 
The European Report on Development emphasizes the need to switch focus to more inclusive 
and sustainable aid in the post-15 global framework for development. They refer to it as “go 
beyond aid”. For example the EU report states, “Levels of ODA should be maintained and 
ideally increased and ODA should be allocated in ways that optimize its impact” (EU, 2013, 
p. 208) Also, foreign direct investment (FDI) and other financial flows should increasingly be 
supported. The EU report argues that the main way to increase income and living standards in 
low income countries and least developed countries is by expanding investment capabilities 
and trade, hence reducing these countries’ ODA dependence. The EU report pushes to go 
“beyond aid”, and holds that creating enabling environments for sustainable growth should be 
focus in the post-15 policies (EU, 2013, p 168-169).  
Simply said: aid needs to go where it can promote sustainable development. Problem: No one 
seems to have the answer of where such aid should be directed to do so. That is why this 
study investigates the effects of aid on FDI: FDI has been argued to be a factor in promoting 
economic growth. If a relationship between ODA and FDI can be established, we also have an 
indication of where to put resources of future policies. FDI can “provide resources that can be 
used to build physical capital thus directly enhancing the productive capacity of recipient 
countries” (EU, 2013, p. 146). In addition, local skills as well as technological knowhow, 
enhanced competitiveness may be improved (EU, 2013, p.146). For these reasons and more, 
the European Report on Development suggests that the post-2015 development agenda 
integrate investment policy in development strategy and investments should be made where 
”growth, productivity and structural transformation” can be encouraged (EU, 2013, p.167).  
The European Commission Communication emphasizes how developing countries, in most 
need of FDI, have been overlooked by EU investors and that more initiatives should be 
considered by the EU to improve this condition. One measure proposed is to blend loans and 
grants to enforce and prolong strategic investments, thus improving the business environment 
in the host countries (te Velde, 2012).  The effectiveness of such an approach to boost private 
flows into developing countries has been questioned. As te Velde (2012) sums up: “If the 
profitable project is not there, no amount of investor protection will lead to more FDI” and 
advocates for a “pull” rather than a “push” approach. That is, rather than focusing on the 
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facilitation for foreign investments in developing countries, EU should focus on how to make 
developing countries profitable for foreign investors. This relates nicely to this analysis on 
how different compositions of EU aid effect FDI.  
Besides a shift over the last decades in FDI flows there has also been a shift of ODA flows. 
Aid projects more and more target public sector reforms e.g. fiscal transparency, civil service, 
legal- and judicial systems, anti-corruption etc. (Karakaplan et al. p. 4, 2005). In this analysis 
these types ODA flows are represented foremost by the official development assistance 
targeting the social infrastructure. In fact, this shift of ODA donor preference has, in a steady 
rate, tripled the amount of ODA to social infrastructure over the last two decades and now 
amounts to 40 percent of total world ODA (Akramov, 2012, p.2). In contrast, ODA to 
productive sectors declined between 1995 and 2007 and ODA to economic infrastructure fell 
from 23 percent of total ODA 1995 to 12.3 percent eight years later (UNDP 2013, p168-170). 
It might be worth mentioning however, that even though an increase in ODA related to 
sectors that are highly interlinked with democratic characteristics, it is not necessarily 
democratic characteristics that determine the direction of FDI flows. Rather, the willingness 
of receiving countries to adjust such administrative sectors may in fact be just another way of 
ODA rent seeking (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). Nevertheless, when such improvements are 
implemented and successful the business climate will also be improved, not only for FDI but 
also for domestic investment.   
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3 Method 
As it is difficult for governments in developing countries to have a say regarding firm-specific 
factors, this study will take form around FDI theory regarding location-specific factors i.e. 
host-specific factors in accordance with Dunning & Narula, 2000; Nunnenkamp, 2002; 
Karakaplan, 2005; te Velde, 2012; and Mayer, 2006 and the European Development Report 
2013. I will in this section present the empirical strategy, included variables and model used 
to investigate whether EU aid shows any short-term effect on foreign direct investment in 
developing countries and if it is possible to distinguish what kind of EU aid is most effective 
in doing so. 
3.1 Empirical Strategy 
To study the effect on FDI from EU sectorial aid I perform a panel data regression analysis on 
59 developing countries. I use a fixed effects model and the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimator for my regressions. Panel data has the good quality of being able to capture factors 
in regressions that are unobserved, unmeasured and/or variables that could cause omitted 
variable bias if excluded from the regression (Dougherty, 2011, p.515). I will assume that 
possible unobserved effects are time invariant. For example, it is reasonable that a country in 
its initial state has some factors (cultural, economic etc.) uniquely attributed to that specific 
country. A fixed effects1 approach can capture such country specific effects by providing a 
dummy for each specific country which is constant over time. I conveniently use Eview’s 
cross-section fixed dummy variables for this reason. I also add period-fixed dummy variables 
to capture possible shocks in time constant over cross-sections. I am aware that a fixed effects 
model with a dummy variables for each country and year will generate many more 
explanatory variables and therefore most likely generate high R2 values, possibly overstating 
the regression explanatory power (Wooldridge, 2006 p.490). Therefore the estimated results 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 A fixed effect model is also used in Alesina and Dollar, Hansen and Tarp, Kapfer et. al. and Selaya and 
Sunesen. 
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are interpreted with caution. For most variables I assume a non-linear relationship to my 
dependent variable FDI (according to new generation of research on aid), and concerned 
variables are therefore transformed using logarithmic transformation, to obtain linear 
relationships. All logged regressors have a prescript of lg.  
 
Because panel data comprise both time series and cross-sections it is most likely subjected to 
both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation which may cause my OLS estimator to be 
inefficient but also give misleading interpretations of the regression coefficients (Dougherty 
2011, p. 283). Although there is a risk that my OLS will be inefficient when dealing with 
arbitrary serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, it is accepted to use OLS with robust 
standard errors, since other methods require that we know the form of heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation (Wooldridge, 2006, p.434). I try to overcome these issues as follows: I use 
White’s standard errors and covariance to generate robust coefficient standard errors 
compatible with heteroskedasticity of unknown form (Wooldridge, 2006, p. 272). I use 
differencing transformation in hope to eliminate serial correlation2  (Wooldridge, 2006, 
p.431). (The results from the Breusch-Godfrey tests are presented in the appendix.) 
 
Another problem with panel data is non-stationarity which might cause standard inference to 
be inappropriate. A test is performed for unit root for all variables included and a difference 
transformation is performed to correct non-stationarity where necessary and possible. The 
difference transformation is also a tool to correct potential serial correlation. All regressors 
that have been differenced have the prescript d (follows that a logged and differenced 
regressor shows the prescript dlg). All variables are presented more explicitly in section 3.2. 
 
The sample consists of 593 countries on the OECD’s DAC-list of recipients. They are 
classified as low-income or middle-income countries. I use yearly data from 1995-2012. 
Some countries have been excluded due to lack of data and the panel is unbalanced. The total 
time period for this regression spans over 18 years 1995-2012, rendering a possibility to look 
at short-term effects only. I use short-period panel data in accordance with Clemens et al. 
(2004). 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
2 Endogeneity is another issue when handling this sort of panel data. Other estimators are often recommended in 
literature on the topic to correct this issue. However, this is out of the scope of this paper.   
3 A list of countries included can be found in the appendix 
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3.2 Variables 
I have restricted my determinants to match the macro-economic literature presented 
previously. I choose to leave out determinants such as democracy, institutional quality 
and colonial ties, partly because accessible data lacked observations for the given years 
and also, these determinants have not shown any conclusive significant effect in 
previous research. The source and a short description of each variable can be found in 
the appendix.  
 
3.2.1 Dependent variable, FDI 
My dependent variable is net FDI-inflows from the World Bank Indicators statistic database, 
and is measured as net inflows in constant price, US dollars. Net FDI-inflows differs from, 
and compose a better measurement than net FDI, which consist of gross inflows of FDI, less 
domestic investment abroad. Net FDI inflows show the flows of foreign capital into a country 
“regardless of that country’s capability to invest abroad” (Kapfer et al. 2007)4. I have not 
distinguished between EU FDI-flows and FDI-flows from other investors, since I hope to 
determine if EU ODA have any total effect on FDI-inflows to developing countries. My FDI-
variable is logged and shows no unit root in this state. 
 
3.2.2 Key Independent Variable, ODA 
My key independent variable is official development assistance ODA, the most used indicator 
of aid flows in research. The purpose of ODA is the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries. It includes official financing flows to developing countries on the 
Development Assistance Committee’s recipient list (the DAC recipient-list). The donors 
constitute 34 OECD member countries, the EC and a few others volunteering their data. 
Noteworthy, ODA statistics measure the outflows of money from a donor country and not the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
4 FDI-flows compose the net sum of capital equity, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. If one of these 
components is negative and it outweighs the sum of the other two components, the net inflow of FDI will be 
negative (World Bank 2014). 
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money received by a developing country. EU ODA comprises the EU’s collective ODA, i.e. 
the sum of ODA reported by the EU member states and the additional ODA provided by EU 
institutions (European Commission, 2013). Official assistance constitutes grants and loans, 
however loans must be concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent 
(OECD, 2014). All my ODA statistics are taken from the OECD Creditor Reporting System 
database (CRP) and are given in constant prices $US. 
 
Sector ODA 
In OECD’s creditor reporting system, Official Development Assistance is categorized sector 
wise: “A sector or main purpose category (e.g. health or energy), defines the main economic 
or social infrastructure categories, which an individual activity is intended to foster” (OECDs 
Creditor reporting System). Data is available for sector classification from 1995, but only for 
ODA commitments. From 2002 there are sector classifications for ODA disbursements, which 
is money that has left the donor.  ODA commitments are a “firm written obligation by a 
government or official agency, backed by an appropriation which is reported in the year in 
which it was made” (Aidinfo, 2013). Disbursements are the most accurate measurement, since 
it is money that has not only been promised, but actually sent. However, since there is no 
available data from 1995-2001 on disbursements, I will use the data on commitments instead. 
This method is used in previous research since “the share of aid disbursed for a broad 
category of purposes generally reflects the share of aid committed for that broad category of 
purposes” (Clemens et al. 2004 p. 14). Clemens et al. (2004), has tested this relationship by 
checking the correlation between the proxy and the true value as fractions of total 
disbursements and found it reliable (Clemens et al 2004 p. 15). ODA commitments will 
therefore act as a proxy for disbursements between the years 1995-2001 in accordance with 
Clemens et al. (2004) and also Selaya & Sunesen (2012). In this paper, I have chosen to 
delimit the ODA sectors used in my regression to the following three: Social infrastructure 
ODAsoc, economic infrastructure ODAeco and production ODApro. Table 1 shows what the 
intended target is for the sector ODA-variables. 
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Table 1. Sector ODA specification 
Variable Targeting Including 
ODAsoc 
Social Infrastructure and services 
Education, health, water supply & sanitation, 
government & civil society (conflict, peace & 
security), other social infrastructure & services Donor: EU 
ODAeco 
Economic infrastructure and 
services 
Transport & storage, communications, energy, 
banking & financial services, business & other 
services 
Donor: EU 
ODApro 
Production sectors 
Agriculture, foresting & fishing; Industry, 
mining & construction; trade policies and 
regulations; tourism Donor: EU 
ODArest 
ODAsoc + ODAeco + ODApro 
from other donors than the EU + 
total ODA spent on other sectors 
Multi sector/Cross-cutting (general environment 
protection), commodity aid, action relating to 
debt, humanitarian aid, administrative costs 
Donor: total donors 
less EU ODAsoc, 
ODAeco & 
ODApro 
 
 
The time span I am investigating is relatively short and the effectiveness of aid on growth 
may require a long period of time to be distinguishable. Therefore, aid flows generating a 
general effect on national growth, such as aid directed towards environment protection, will 
not be of interest in this study since they will only potentially affect FDI in a long-run 
scenario. However, I still chose to include these measures in the total ODA variable to make 
sure that any effect from ODA on FDI is not omitted. Regarding ODAsoc, this sector targets 
potentially long-run effects such as health and education, anti-corruption and democracy. I 
therefore suspect that this variable will not give me any significant results due to the short 
time-span investigated. ODAeco is targeting sectors that could potentially have a more 
immediate effect on FDI for example transportation and communication. I therefore expect 
this variable to be positive and significant. ODApro is targeting sectors of production. It 
should therefore be significant. But the effect of this sector is ambiguous: it could 
complement FDI-seeking activity and act as an agglomeration magnet, but it could also cause 
rent seeking and crowd out FDI. All ODA-variables are logs and in this status they show no 
unit root.  
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3.2.3 Control variables  
Economic development 
The majority of empirical papers reviewed in this analysis have included some form of GDP-
variable as a measure of level of development or market size. I will use GDP per capita 
(GDPcap) in accordance with Kimura and Todo (2010), Hansen and Tarp (2000) and 
Karakaplan et. al. (2005), GDP per capita is also a measurement for the initial level of 
development in each country and thus a proxy for time-varying initial conditions in each 
country (Selaya and Sunesen, 2012, p 2157). GDP per capita is logged and show no unit root 
in this state. 
 
GDP Growth 
As another pull factor I will include GDP-growth (GDPgr) as a measure for market size. It is 
likely that investors are attracted to markets that are growing rapidly, and hopefully this 
variable will also in a short run show to be significant and positive. Also, GDP growth is a 
measurement for business cycles.  I use GDP-growth in accordance with Karakaplan et al. and 
Kapfer et al. The variable shows no unit root and is therefore not manipulated. 
 
Openness 
I use as a measurement for openness the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP 
representing trade (TRDgdp). This is a determinant representing general policy of a 
developing country where a higher value indicates a friendlier climate for foreign firms, e.g. 
less red tape, hence constituting another pull factor for FDI inflows. However, the explanatory 
force of trade on FDI has been challenged. For example, even when trade barriers and red 
tape restrict trade, firms attempt to circumvent them. As mentioned earlier, this in particular 
has been the case in countries with vast natural resources. Also the relationship can be 
endogenous, where FDI have an effect on trade (Moosa, 2002, p.5). Moreover, FDI is mostly 
invested in sectors of trade. If aid increases the supply of traded goods, thus lowering the 
price relative non tradable goods, aid may discourage FDI (Kimura & Todo, 2009, p.484). As 
a measure for openness, I suspect this variable to be positive and significant. This variable is 
included as well in Karakaplan et al, Harms and Lutz, and Kapfer et. al. My variable is logged 
and differenced to avoid non-stationarity.   
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Competitiveness 
The exchange rate affects the wealth of multinational corporations (MNCs). When a host 
country’s currency is depreciating, FDI in the country has shown to increase (Karakaplan 
2005, p.7). A company’s will to invest abroad may act as a substitute for export in that FDI 
“hedge economic exposure to foreign exchange risks” (Moosa, 2002, p. 45). However, it is 
not only the fluctuations in the exchange rate that are of interest when measuring international 
market competitiveness, so are cost and price trends. One way to capture this competitiveness 
is the use of the nominal effective exchange rate deflated by nominal unit labor costs. This 
real effective exchange rate (REER) becomes a measurement of a host country’s 
competitiveness and is expected to have a negative relationship to FDI since a rise in the 
REER-index indicates a loss in competiveness. Since exchange rates may fluctuate it provides 
a good short-term measure for foreign investors will to invest. This variable is also included 
by Karkaplan et al., Harms and Lutz, and Kapfer et al. This variable is logged and 
differenced.  
 
Inflation 
As a measurement of macroeconomic stability, I add inflation rate to the regression. 
Karakaplan et al. and Harms and Lutz also include this control variable. Inflation (INFL) 
shows the rate of price change in a country as a whole and uses the annual growth rate of the 
GDP implicit deflator. A high inflation5 is a sign of economic instability and I expect this 
variable to have a negative relationship to FDI and the coefficient to be negative. This 
variable is not transformed in any way and is stationary.  
 
Savings 
Selaya and Sunesen explain how a high level of domestic savings lowers the need for foreign 
capital (2012, p. 2157). This would mean that savings do have an effect on FDI and that it is 
negative. I will include gross domestic savings as % of GDP (Sgdp). This coefficient could 
capture a possible crowding out effect and is expected to be negative in the regression. I am 
unsure of the effect of this variable. It could also show the level of development since more 
savings indicates more potential private investment.  The variable is logged and differenced 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
5 Looking at the residuals I found some irregularity in their normal distribution. When investigating the data 
closer, the Democratic Republic of Congo showed immense hyperinflation during the years of civil war 98-01. 
These observations have been excluded from the analysis. 
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and show no unit root in this status.  
Human Capital  
Human capital is often brought up to be a determinant of FDI. A common measure for human 
capital is education. I use gross enrollment ratio to secondary education to try to capture 
human capital (SCHOOL). I hope this variable show to be significant and positive although 
its effect might require a longer time period to show any effect. My original variable shows 
non-stationarity and is therefore differenced.  
 
Employment 
I have not found any previous research using employment as a determinant of FDI. My 
reasoning is that in a higher level of employment is embedded economic stability and more 
human capital than in a lower level of employment. Therefore this should be a pull-factor for 
foreign firms. Also, agglomeration effects are considered to be FDI-pull factor, and high 
employment indicates more business activity. Therefore, the employment coefficient should 
turn out positive and significant. The measure consists of employment to population over 15 
years old ratio, in percent (EMPL). This variable is both logged and differenced.  
 
FDI Facilitation Policy 
This measurement shows the ability of governments to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development and is therefore 
in the category of FDI policy (POLITY). This variable is an index and not transformed. 
 
Natural Resources 
Natural resources are another possible FDI location-specific determinant. As discussed above, 
FDI flows to developing countries are changing course from resource seeking- to alternative 
seeking activities. However, this shift is interlinked with the level of development in a 
country. Less developed countries are more inclined to attract resource-seeking FDI. 
Especially export driven FDI is dependent on the location-specifics of natural resources and 
investors claim to natural resources may in fact outweigh country risks and trade barriers 
(Kapfer et. al, 2007). To capture this effect on FDI, I use the variable natural resource 
depletion (NR). Simplified, natural resource depletion constitutes the ration of the value of 
forest-, energy- and mineral depletion to the remaining reserve lifetime of each resource. It 
includes coal, crude oil, natural gas, gold, silver, copper and more and is presented as percent 
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of GNI. This variable is used as a proxy to capture the natural resources attracting FDI and I 
expect it to be positive. My variable is logged and differenced. 
 
 
Infrastructure 
It is suggested in FDI literature that FDI is determined by business facilitation and level of 
infrastructure. I propose a variable to capture a level of a country’s technology and 
advancement in business facilitation: infrastructure measured as electric power consumption 
kWh per capita (POWcap). Electric power consumption measures the production of power 
plants and combined heat and power plants less transmission, distribution, and transformation 
losses and own use by heat and power plants. The variable is logged and differenced.  
 
Population 
I add population in my regression as a control for country size (POP). Forms of population 
measures are included in Kapfer et al. and Selaya and Sunesen. This variable is logged. 
 
3.3 Model Strategy 
The model for analysis is divided into two steps. The purpose of the first step is to see if 
any significant relationship between the three ODA sectors combined and FDI exists. I 
run the first regression on FDI with all control variables. In accordance to previous 
research it is reasonable to assume that changes in foreign direct investment are affected 
by conditions also prior to current effects. Although I am interested in a short-run 
scenario, I include one lag for each explanatory variable to follow praxis. Lastly, I 
specify my model. The general regression specification model for step 1 is: 
 
(1)  𝐹𝐷𝐼!" =   𝛽!𝑂𝐷𝐴!" +   𝛽!𝑋!"+  𝛼!   + ƭ!+  uit    
 
where FDI is total FDI inflows, ODA is a EU ODA,  X represents a vector of control 
variables, α is a time invariant country fixed effect, ƭ is a time dependent fixed effect for 
country i and year t, and u is the disturbance term assumed to possess the usual 
desirable characteristics.  
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The purpose of step two is to separate the possible effects of sector ODA on FDI, 
determine their separate effects and test the sensitivity of the results. I run the regression 
with separated ODA sectors (ODAeco, ODApro and ODAsoc) and their lags. The 
general regression specification model for step 2 is:  
 
(2) 𝐹𝐷𝐼 =   𝛽!𝑂𝐷𝐴!"#!" + 𝛽!𝑂𝐷𝐴!"#!" + 𝛽!𝑂𝐷𝐴!"#!"   𝛽!𝑋!"+  𝛼!   + ƭ!+  uit 
 
I then perform three sensitivity tests. The first sensitivity test tests the efficiency 
consistency by eliminating the highly correlated ODArest. High correlation between 
explanatory variables makes it difficult to distinguish explanatory effects, because one 
explanatory variable may capture the effect of another. The second sensitivity check 
tests the robustness of my results without fixed effects but with weighted least squares. 
As mentioned in section 3.1, I include White’s robust standard errors in my fixed effects 
regression, but I have not however, corrected for heteroskedasticity in my variables. 
Although I cannot specifically identify the form of heteroskedasticity it is assumedly 
better in strong cases of heteroskedasticity to use the wrong form in combination with 
weighted least squares than no correction using OLS (Wooldridge 2006, p. 289). Fixed 
effects dummies are not compatible with this method and I therefore have to take into 
consideration omitted variables bias. The third sensitivity test tests the sensitivity of my 
variable specification. I do this by exchanging my dependent and explanatory variables 
from constant prices to prices per capita and excluding population as a control for 
country size. A complete presentation of each regression specification is presented in 
the appendix. 
 
Through this strategy I hope to make some conclusions regarding the effects of EU ODA 
targeting economic infrastructure, production factors and/or social infrastructure on FDI, and 
thus providing a step towards EU future policy on aid flows.  
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4 Results 
This section presents the results of this investigation, explained and commented in short. The 
results and sensitivity checks are presented in the order of the two steps performed.  
4.1.1 Results: Step 1 
The purpose of step 1 is to see if the combined effect of ODAeco, ODApro and 
ODAsoc is significant and to specify my model. My first regression produces 
statistically significant ODA variables (Table 2, Regression 1). The ODAsec coefficient 
implies that one percent increase in EU ODA targeting economic- and social- 
infrastructure and production factors will generate a 0.18 percent increase in foreign 
direct investment inflows. Also several of my FDI determinants turn out significant, 
generally with the expected sign. One exception is POWcap indicating that this proxy is 
missing its true measurement-purpose of infrastructure.  
 
As I add lags in Regression 2, the explanatory power of my coefficients tends to 
decrease (Table 2, Regression 2). Not many lagged variables come out significant and 
few of the standard FDI determinants hold any statistical significance at all in this 
regression. Also lagged variables remove many of my observations. Still, my R2 value 
is showing a questionable high explanatory power. A high R2 value is expected when 
using fixed effects model because the fixed effects model includes dummies for country 
AND time specific effects creating a possible over-specified model. Consequently, 
much of the variation in the data is explained (Wooldridge, 2006, p.490). Although 
many of my control variables fall out of statistical significance, ODAsec and ODArest 
stays significant at 10 percent probability level. However, lagged ODA surprisingly 
does not show any significance.  
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Table 2.  Results of step 1.  OLS estimator with fixed country and time effects. 
White robust errors. Dependent variable: LGFDI. 
  Regression 1 Regression 2, with lags Regression 3: specified 
Observations 483 404 776 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
C -6.101 7.129 -12.807* 7.036 -13.456*** 2.995 
LGODASEC 0.181** 0.084 0.193* 0.110 0.101* 0.059 
LGODAREST 0.152** 0.074 0.125* 0.070 0.146** 0.059 
LGGDPCAP 1.427*** 0.314 1.307 1.205 1.329*** 0.127 
GDPGR 0.029* 0.019 0.037** 0.017 0.026** 0.013 
INFL -0.008* 0.004 -0.003 0.008 -0.008** 0.003 
DLGREER -0.319 0.428 -0.084 1.147 -0.473 0.420 
DLGNR 0.173* 0.094 0.205** 0.095 0.024 0.042 
DLGSGDP 0.230** 0.098 0.080 0.130 0.026 0.094 
DLGTRDGDP 0.320 0.453 0.306 0.393 0.269 0.342 
DLGPOWCAP -0.466 0.591 -0.807 0.907 x x 
DLGEMPL 2.390 1.588 2.964 2.071 x x 
POLITY -0.018 0.043 -0.004 0.059 x x 
DSCHOOL 0.008 0.013 -0.003 0.021 x x 
LGPOP 0.149 2.228 3.720 17.59 2.704*** 0.825 
GDPGR(-1) x x 0.037 0.015 0.025*** 0.007 
DLGSGDP(-1) x x -0.432*** 0.159 -0.038 0.092 
DLGPOWCAP(-
1) 
x x 1.062* 0.546 x x 
LGODASEC(-1) x x 0.089 0.116 0.118* 0.060 
LGODAREST(-1) x x -0.020 0.055 -0.036 0.046 
DLGTRDGDP(-
1) 
x x 0.342 0.516 0.721*** 0.241 
LGGDPCAP(-1) x x 0.100 1.217 x x 
DLGREER(-1) x x 0.046 0.487 x x 
INFL(-1) x x -0.001 0.005 x x 
DSCHOOL(-1) x x 0.007 0.016 x x 
LGPOP(-1) x x -1.649 17.07 x x 
POLITY(-1) x x 0.013 0.038 x x 
R2-value 0.900689   0.912545   0.896365   
Significance levels: * p< 0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01*** 
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To restrict my model and come to terms with possible over-specification, the following 
variables are excluded. Human capital (SCHOOL), FDI facilitation policy (POLITY), 
employment (EMPL) and infrastructure (POWcap) have not shown any significant 
results in my two regressions. For the variables SCHOOL and POLITY I suspect their 
real effect on FDI cannot be determined in the period of time I am investigating. 
Moreover, my POLITY data suffers from serious lack of observations affecting the total 
regression result, but also diminishes the true explanatory force of FDI facilitating 
policies. I eliminate these variables with the assumption that they are captured by time 
invariant country-specific effects and thus accounted for in my fixed effects analysis 
(after all I only use a time period of 18 years). Regarding employment (EMPL) and 
infrastructure (POWcap), their inclusion is more of an experimental proxy to try to 
capture a country’s business activity and level of infrastructure. I try the sensitivity of 
my POWcap variable by exchanging the proxy to energy use as a measure of kg oil 
equivalent per capita, but for this exchange my measure stands robustly insignificant. I 
subordinate to previous research (of which I find none to include these two specific 
proxys) and exclude them in my specified regression. The intercept in this type of 
regression model, is an average of the individual-specific intercepts, and show little 
interpretable information.  
  
Most lags show high correlation to their un-lagged equivalent (for example POP and 
POP(-1) show correlation of 0.999) which will make it difficult to discriminate between 
current and lagged effects. I drop lagged control variables with a correlation to current 
variables of 0.5 and above. The result of this manipulation can be found in Regression 3 
which is my specified model.  
 
My specified regression, (Table 2, Regression 3, or appendix regression specification 
Regression (3)), shows that while some of FDI theory’s determinants still holds 
statistically significant, some have fallen short. GDP per capita and GDP growth are 
highly positive and significant confirming previous FDI theory. The inflation rate is 
significant showing a negative relationship to FDI as predicted. The real exchange rate 
used as a proxy for competiveness, shows a negative relationship to FDI as predicted, 
but is not significant. Natural resources show the expected sign, but no statistical 
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significance. Savings is not significant. Openness (TRD) is not significant, but its lag is 
(in the literature studied, trade have contradictory impacts on FDI).  
 
Most importantly, ODAsec still shows positive and significant, indicating that a 1% 
increase in EU sector ODA will increase total foreign direct investment inflows to 
developing countries with 0.1%. Although the estimated efficiency is somewhat 
reduced from regression 1, the specified model in regression 3 is more reliable due to 
the larger number of observations and exclusion of variables causing possible model 
over-specification. This is also the regression used in the continuous part of the 
investigation. 
4.1.2 Results: Step 2 
In this section I present the results of step 2 in my model: distinguishing the effects of 
the EU ODAeco, ODApro and ODAsoc and the results from their sensitivity checks. 
Results are presented in Table 4. 
 
Regarding the sector-separated ODA variables, the result shows some difference from 
my original expectations (for comparison between predicted outcome and actual 
outcome, table 3). ODA targeting economic infrastructure shows no significant effect 
on FDI in contrast to my expectations, and ODA targeting social infrastructure does. 
ODA targeting production sectors turns out highly significant (table 4 (4), “Fixed 
Effects with OLS and Robust White Errors”). My results imply that a one percent 
increase in each of EU ODAeco, ODApro and ODAsoc, generates a 0.01, 0,05 and 0,1 
percent increase respectively in world FDI-inflows. This shows that ODAsoc contains 
most efficiency in promoting FDI and that the effect is detectable also in a short time 
period. All ODA sectors come out positive, indicating that ODApro’s complementary 
effects outweigh its crowding out effect. It is in respect to this regression I perform my 
sensitivity checks. 
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Table 3.  Predicted and estimated results of ODAsec variables Step 2.  
EU Targeting Predicted results Estimation results 
ODAeco Economic infrastructure and 
services 
Significant.  
Positive coefficient 
Not Significant (0/4). 
 Positive coefficient. 
ODApro Production sectors Significant.  
Ambiguous coefficient. 
Significant (4/4). 
Positive Coefficient 
ODAsoc Social Infrastructure and 
services 
Not significant. 
Positive coefficient. 
Significant: (3/4). 
Positive coefficient 
The fraction following "significant:" is the number of times the variable has shown to be statistically 
significant of the four regressions in Step 2. 
 
The first sensitivity check is a control to see if my estimator coefficients are robust to 
ODArest exclusion. Since my ODA-variables are quite correlated with one another, and 
especially with ODArest, the OLS estimator might have trouble separating their 
different effects. Excluding ODArest show small differences in the results of estimator 
coefficient magnitude (see table 2 (5)).  
 
The second sensitivity check is a robustness control when correcting for 
heteroskedasticity.  The robust standard errors of fixed effects OLS and Weighted Least 
Squares OLS can be compared in Table 2 (4) and (6). Since I do not include fixed 
effects in this sensitivity test, I am aware of potentially biased estimates. For this test, 
ODAeco have roughly the same estimated coefficient and is still not significant. 
ODApro is still significant and its effect has increased. ODAsoc is no longer significant 
and its explanatory effect has dramatically been reduced. The loss of explanatory power 
when country specific effects are removed, indicates that although there is a positive 
effect on FDI, the effect cannot be accounted for unless specifics for each country are 
included. ODAeco stays more or less the same.  
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Table 4.  Results: Categorized ODA-variables and sensitivity checks. Dependent variable LGFDI 
  
(4) Categorized 
ODA: Fixed effects 
with OLS and 
White robust std. e. 
(5) Sensitivity Check  
Effectiveness; 
excluding ODArest 
White robust std. e. 
(6) Sesitivity Check  
GLS Weighted 
model, no fixed 
effects, White 
robust std. .e, OLS 
(7) Sensitivity Check 
FDI/cap and 
ODA/cap, White 
robust std. e. 
Observations 776 776 776 776 
Variable Coefficient Std. E Coeefficient Std. E Coefficient Std. E Coefficient Std. E 
C -12.863*** 2.806 -12.632*** 2.762 -7.407*** 0.274 -6.505*** 0.853 
LGODAECO 0.013 0.018 0.012 0.017 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.019 
LGODAPRO 0.045** 0.020 0.058*** 0.021 0.067*** 0.019 0.046** 0.021 
LGODASOC 0.108** 0.049 0.152***  0.040  0.001 0.039 0.096* 0.051 
LGODAREST 0.143** 0.056 x  x   0.180*** 0.043 0.144*** 0.054 
LGGDPCAP 1.325*** 0.120 1.312***  0.108  1.365*** 0.024 1.289*** 0.115 
GDPGR 0.026** 0.013 0.028**  0.017  0.049*** 0.010 0.025** 0.012 
INFL -0.009** 0.004 -0.009**  0.004  -0.001 0.002 -0.009** 0.003 
DLGREER -0.580 0.446 -0.557  0.457  -0.254 0.313 -0.582 0.436 
DLGNR 0.031 0.040 0.032  0.043  -0.001 0.040 0.033 0.038 
DLGSGDP 0.010 0.093 0.003  0.093  0.120** 0.059 0.021 0.099 
DLGTRDGDP 0.225 0.371 0.273  0.389  0.446 0.350 0.229 0.372 
LGPOP 2.595*** 0.804 2.695***  0.832  0.664*** 0.016 x x 
GDPGR(-1) 0.025 0.007 0.027***  0.006  0.043*** 0.012 0.025*** 0.007 
DLGSGDP(-1) -0.034 0.093 -0.031  0.095  -0.032 0.061 -0.018 0.096 
LGODAECO(-1) -0.002 0.021 -0.001  0.023  -0.022*** 0.006 -0.004 0.021 
LGODAPRO(-1) 0.038** 0.018 0.035**  0.018  0.029 0.019 0.039** 0.019 
LGODASOC(-1) 0.022 0.039 0.021  0.037  -0.069* 0.040 0.015 0.036 
LGODAREST(-1) -0.029 0.050 x  x   0.106*** 0.034 -0.019 0.053 
DLGTRDGDP(-1) 0.712*** 0.255 0.729***  0.268  0.674*** 0.207 0.742*** 0.250 
R2-value 0.897 0.895 0.901 0.847 
Significance levels: * p< 0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01*** 
     
 
In the third and final sensitivity check I exchange my dependent and explanatory 
variables from constant prices to per capita measures to see if they are correctly 
specified. The ODA-coefficients stand fairly robust in significance and in efficiency.  
 
To sum up, the regression results show that EU ODA is significant in affecting FDI 
inflows to developing countries. EU ODA targeting social infrastructure appears to be 
the most efficient sector ODA in doing so, but is also least robust through the sensitivity 
tests. EU ODA targeting production sectors stand positive and robust through all 
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sensitivity tests. And finally, EU ODA targeting economic factors appears to be 
insignificant in this model, with a low efficiency coefficient. I will in my next chapter 
discuss more thoroughly the implications of these results.   
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5 Discussion and analysis 
I have concluded in my study that EU official development assistance is a statistical 
significant determinant to world FDI, and that the significance for EU ODA targeting 
production sectors and social infrastructure stands significant in the context of this 
analysis. I will here provide a more nuanced discussion and analysis of my regression 
results. I will start by discussing the results of the ODA-variables, in respect to FDI 
theory and in the light of previous research. I will then shortly discuss the outcome of 
the control variables in a similar manner. Also, I will address some possible restrictions 
in the model. Finally, I will shortly mention the implications in setting the new 
development agenda. 
 
ODA 
 
EU ODA targeting economic infrastructure turned out to be insignificant in all 
regressions and sensitivity tests. This is surprising since investments in public 
infrastructure such as energy distribution, road construction and communication 
improvements, according to previous research, encourage private investment (see 
Selaya & Sunesen and others). If we for a second leave the statistical significance be, 
and take a look at the economic significance, EU ODA targeting economic 
infrastructure turns out to be the least effective in affecting FDI-inflows, which is also 
surprising. There are some possible economic reasons for this result. As mentioned 
earlier, the flows of ODA to the developing world has changed from economic targets 
to more social infrastructure targets over the last decade, which may have lead 
developing countries to a infrastructural gap (UNDP, 2013 p. 175). In fact, the fall of 
ODAeco from 23 percent to 12.3 percent of total ODA between the years 1995 to 2003, 
covers a significant part of the time period I am investigating. This may in fact have 
diminished the effect of ODAeco’s effectiveness on FDI, relative the other sectors. 
Also, looking at the ODAeco, its composition is quite wide ranging: from close 
production-related road-construction to the more indirectly linked bank-service sector. 
As concluded by Selaya and Sunesen, the composition of aid matters. ODAeco may 
consist of both complementary factors to FDI and crowding out effects. This indicates 
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that to find the true efficiency of the ODAeco variable, a narrower and perhaps more 
qualitative study-approach is required, where type of FDI and specific country location 
advantages is taken more into consideration.   
 
Looking at ODApro, the estimate is consistently significant and positive. This implies 
that ODA targeting production sectors are an important element in attracting FDI. My 
pre-assumption for ODApro was unsure, since previous research suggests that financing 
production with aid will crowd out FDI that could have otherwise been undertaken by 
private investors. However my results suggest that ODApro in fact is a valid channel for 
FDI promotion. Also the production sector has had a decline of disbursements on behalf 
of social sector ODA. This is apparent in the variable’s economic efficiency relative 
ODAsoc. Production sector ODA incorporate agriculture, fishing and mining (among 
other things) and while ODA increases have been made in industry and mining 
constructions in the last decade, agriculture and fisheries have stagnated (UNDP, 2013 
p.168). To evaluate the true efficiency of EU production sector-ODA will require a 
firmer classification of recipients and their capabilities towards FDI-motivations. 
 
EU Social infrastructure ODA shows to be most economic efficient ODA sector to FDI 
inflows. This sector constitutes 40 percent of total world ODA (Akramov, 2012, p.2). It 
is also the ODA sector that shows the least consistency through the sensitivity checks of 
this analysis. I expected this variable to show no significance because its components 
(education, health and good governance for example) are likely to have a long-term 
effect on FDI and the variable’s current effect is therefore not captured here. Arguably, 
social infrastructure ODA should be highly linked with underlying factors such as 
democracy, governmental quality, and human capital and could possibly pick up their 
omitted variables bias. Although this might say something about the importance of such 
factors to FDI-inflows, it does not necessarily prove that ODAsoc towards policy 
reforms is effective. This interpretation suggests that ODAsoc does not have any direct 
impact on FDI-inflows but rather that education, health and government and civil 
society etcetera do.  
 
Comparing the standard deviation for ODAsoc with ODApro and ODAeco, ODAsoc is 
relatively lower (1.26 compared to 1.53 and 2.15) implying that the level of ODAsoc is 
more constant over time and countries and that ODApro and ODAeco are more volatile 
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over, and less evenly distributed across countries. This in turn suggests that ODApro 
and ODAeco are more sensitive to type of FDI and the level of absorption capacity.  
The high explanatory power of ODAsoc may also be a clue to that whilst ODApro and 
ODAeco are targeting more specific projects and need to be investigated in the light of 
type of FDI, ODAsoc has a more general effect in improving the overall political and 
economic climate.  
 
I have encountered some restrictions to sectorial EU ODA variables’ behavior. First, the 
ODA variable from 1995 up to 2001 is a proxy. A country’s commitment does not have 
to equal its final disbursements, and it is reasonable to assume that the proxy is 
overconfident in its values (that the commitment is larger than the actual disbursement). 
Hence, the effects on FDI may be overstated. Second, although a sector categorization 
of ODA is in line with current research methods, the sector classifications used by the 
OECD are still broad. An even narrower breakdown could be beneficial. Third, the 
ODA variables are correlated, suggesting that their individual effects should be 
interpreted with care. Fourth, in comparing the different sectors, we have not considered 
the cost at their destination. Building a road, improving fishery production or reform a 
policy-making process all have incomparable absorptive capacities in real costs and in 
the value of their output, which makes it difficult to draw conclusions on their real 
effectiveness on FDI. This is something that previous literature seems to have 
overlooked when comparing different sector ODA.   
 
Control variables 
 
GDP per capita and GDP growth are both significant and positive as expected and in 
accordance, with previous theory, indicating that both present economic level and the 
prospective level is a factor to consider for investors. The inflation rate and real 
exchange rate have a negative coefficient as expected. The inflation rate implies that 
foreign investors are deterred in economic instability. The exchange rate-coefficient 
shows the effect of losing competitiveness, but is not significant. Domestic saving is not 
significant in my specified model. Natural resources are not significant in most 
regressions, and yet have deep theoretical rooting in FDI-theory. However, I am not too 
concerned, in much of the presented literature, natural resources are not included and 
when they are, the statistical significance is undetermined. Natural resources do 
however, show positive correlation to trade, confirming previous theory, that NR is a 
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determinant for FDI relating to trade. Lagged trade is highly significant indicating that 
investors invest in respect to previous years’ production outcome. The initial state of 
openness is however not significant but show the expected sign. Trade is significant in 
most previous research. Ultimately, it may come down to the type of FDI; is it trade-
oriented or not. Lastly population is highly significant, but also highly correlated to 
ODA and FDI. As brought forward earlier, theory suggests that determinants to FDI-
flows to developing countries require a nuanced approach. Although I have chosen 
control variables that are largely concurrent to previous research, many of them fail to 
stay statistically significant in my model. One explanation can be the relative high 
variance in the data of developing countries. According to FDI theory, FDI 
determinants differ vastly depending on the status of the country and the type of firm 
activity.  
 
Model restrictions 
It is commonly noted in panel regression analysis, including a wide range of countries 
and macro-economic variables over time, that both heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation is present (see appendix for Breusch-Godfrey test of serial correlation). I 
have taken this into consideration using robust standard errors and lags. However, I stay 
modest to the actual explanatory power of my estimates, recognizing that the OLS 
estimator has some restrictions handling these issues. I am also aware that the timespan 
investigated here is quite short and that a longer period may locate more constant 
patterns over time. However, the shift in the preconditions and the determinants for FDI 
are a quite recent trend, only about two decades. In such manner, this analysis has a 
current time perspective. 
 
Policy implications 
As FDI has been more and more established as a positive force in development, newer 
research and theory suggests a more refined approach to the FDI and development 
relationship, where “type of FDI, firm characteristics and economic conditions and 
policies” and motivation of FDI are considered (te Velde, 2006, p.4). The European 
Development Report finds it hard to decisively distinguish the effects of EU ODA. For 
the EU, in setting a new agenda for development policy, the traditional macro-economic 
approaches need to be dissected and more qualitative, catching a wider range of 
characteristics for both FDI and ODA.  
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6 Conclusion 
 
This paper has studied whether EU aid shows any short-term effect on foreign direct 
investments in developing countries, and if it is possible to distinguish what sort of EU 
aid is most efficient in doing so. My results show that aid has a significant effect on 
FDI. However, when trying to specify what kind of sector ODA is most efficient, I find 
a comparative analysis difficult. The actual volume of ODA differs vastly between the 
different sectors; the variability within each sector is wide; there has been a big shift 
from ODAeco and ODApro to ODAsoc over the last two decades; and cost-aspects, or 
value added, are difficult to compare. My results show that ODA to social infrastructure 
is most economically effective, hence indicating that the underlying factors of 
governmental quality are important for FDI flows. That ODA to production sectors are 
significant and robust in attracting FDI and that ODA to economic sectors are not 
significant at all. The last result is arguably a combined effect of a variable to varied and 
subdued to declining support over the timespan investigated.  
 
As this study has shown, the overall effect of ODA is hard to capture due to the many 
nuances of both aid and FDI. An even more restricted analysis, separating countries by 
level of development and potential location specific advantages is needed to fully 
capture FDI inflows and to empirically have ground for new EU aid policy 
implementation. 
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8 Appendix 
Table 5.  ODA by Sector specification 
I. Social Infrastructure & Services 
 
  
I.1. Education 
I.1.b. Basic Education 
I.2. Health 
I.2.b. Basic Health 
I.3. Population Pol./Progr. & Reproductive Health 
I.4. Water Supply & Sanitation 
I.5. Government & Civil Society 
I.5.a. Government & Civil Society-general 
I.5.b. Conflict, Peace & Security 
  I.6. Other Social Infrastructure & Services 
II. Economic Infrastructure & Services 
  
II.1. Transport & Storage 
II.2. Communications 
II.3. Energy 
II.4. Banking & Financial Services 
II.5. Business & Other Services 
III. Production Sectors 
  
III.1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 
III.2. Industry, Mining, Construction 
III.3.a. Trade Policies & Regulations 
III.3.b. Tourism 
IV. Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting   
V. Total Sector Allocable (I+II+III+IV)   
VI. Commodity Aid / General Prog. 
Ass. 
  
VI.1. General Budget Support 
  VI.2. Dev. Food Aid/Food Security Ass. 
VII. Action Relating to Debt   
VIII. Humanitarian Aid   
IX. Unallocated / Unspecified   
From OECD Statistical data base: Creditor Reporting System 
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Regression specifications: 
 
(1) lgFDI = lgODAsec + lgODArest + lgGDPcap + GDPgr + INFL + dlgREER + 
dlgNR + dlgSgdp + dlgTRDgdp + dlgPOWcap + dlgEMPL + POLITY + dSCHOOL+ lgPOP 
+ u. 
(2) lgFDI = lgODAsec + lgODArest + lgGDPcap + GDPgr + INFL + dlgREER + 
dlgNR + dlgSgdp + dlgTRDgdp + dlgPOWcap + dlgEMPL + POLITY + dSCHOOL+ lgPOP 
+ lgODAsec(-1) + lgODArest(-1) + lgGDPcap(-1) + GDPgr(-1) + INFL(-1) + dlgREER + (-
1) dlgNR(-1) + dlgSgdp(-1) dlgTRDgdp(-1) + dlgPOWcap(-1) + dlgEMPL(-1) + POLITY(-1) 
+ dSCHOOL(-1) + lgPOP(-1) + u. 
(3) lgFDI = lgODAsec + lgODArest + lgGDPcap + GDPgr + INFL + dlgREER + 
dlgNR + dlgSgdp + dlgTRDgdp + lgPOP + lgODAsec(-1) + lgODArest(-1)  + GDPgr(-1)  + 
dlgNR(-1) + dlgSgdp(-1) + dlgTRDgdp(-1) + u. 
(4) lgFDI = lgODAeco + lgODApro + ODAsoc + lgODArest + lgGDPcap + GDPgr 
+ INFL + dlgREER + dlgNR + dlgSgdp + dlgTRDgdp + lgPOP + lgODAeco(-1) + 
lgODApro(-1) + lgODAsoc(-1) + lgODArest(-1) +  GDPgr(-1) + dlgNR(-1) + dlgSgdp(-1) + 
dlgTRDgdp(-1) + u  
(5) lgFDI = lgODAeco + lgODApro + ODAsoc + lgGDPcap + GDPgr + INFL + 
dlgREER + dlgNR + dlgSgdp + dlgTRDgdp + lgPOP + lgODAeco(-1) + lgODApro(-1) + 
lgODAsoc(-1) +  GDPgr(-1) + dlgNR(-1) + dlgSgdp(-1) + dlgTRDgdp(-1) + u 
(6) same as (4) 
(7) lg(FDI/cap) = lg(ODAeco/cap) + lg(ODApro/cap) + lg(ODAsoc/cap) + 
lg(ODArest/cap) + lgGDPcap + GDPgr + INFL + dlgREER + dlgNR + dlgSgdp + 
dlgTRDgdp + (lg(ODAeco/cap))(-1) + (lg(ODApro/cap))(-1) + (lg(ODAsoc/cap)(-1) + 
(lg(ODArest/cap))(-1) +  GDPgr(-1) + dlgNR(-1) + dlgSgdp(-1) + dlgTRDgdp(-1) + u. 
Where lg is a prefix for the natural logarithm, d is a prefix if the variable has been differenced 
and dlg is a prefix for a differenced log of a variable. 
